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Forthcoming, Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur (RIDA), October 2014 
Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with 
International Norms – Part I (making available right) 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Columbia University School of Law* 
Abstract 
This Letter from the U.S. addresses U.S. compliance with its international 
obligation to implement the “making available right” set out in art. 8 of the 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty.  The “umbrella solution” which enabled member states 
to protect the “making available to the public of [authors’] works in such a way 
that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them” through a combination of extant exclusive rights, 
notably the distribution right and the public performance right, has not in the U.S. 
afforded secure coverage of the full scope of the right.  Lower courts have divided 
over the application of the distribution right to offers to make works available for 
download.  The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the public performance right in 
ABC v Aereo jeopardized application of that right to on-demand streaming.  The 
Supreme Court’s reversal in Aereo has narrowed the gap between domestic law 
and international norms, but leaves many questions.  
In assessing the impact of the Supreme Court’s Aereo opinion on the state of U.S. 
compliance with the WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right, I focus on four 
issues:  
a. coverage of a-synchronous transmissions; 
b. identification of “the public” and “members of the public” consistently 
with their meaning in the WIPO Treaties;  
c. interpretation of the public performance right in a way that does not 
limit the right to actual transmissions, but instead encompasses offers to 
transmit performances of works. 
d. the relevance of a “volition” prerequisite to application of the public 
performance and reproduction rights, and the consistency of any such 
prerequisite with international norms. 
I conclude that the Supreme Court’s Aereo opinion alleviates some concerns 
about the conformity of U.S. copyright law with international norms, but the limited 
                                                            
* Thanks to Dr. Rebecca Giblin, June Besek, Jeffrey Cunard, and for research assistance to Taylor Jones, Columbia 
Law School class of 2014, and Nell Ethridge, Columbia Law School class of 2015. 
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scope of the decision allows other shortcomings to persist.  Thus, the Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed the reach of the public performance right with respect to: 
near-real time individualized digital retransmissions to members of the public of 
broadcast content (akin to cable retransmissions); 
a-synchronous transmissions to members of the public when the primary value of 
the service to its customers is to transmit performances of content the customers 
did not themselves store with the service, or regarding which the customers did 
not enjoy some possessory relationship to a copy or right to access  
Although the Court did not expressly state that the public performance right 
encompassed offers to transmit performances as well as actual performances, the logic of 
the decision points toward the broader (and internationally harmonious) interpretation. 
The majority did not apply a specific “volition” predicate to determine whether a 
retransmission service “performs” the content it communicates, but it acknowledged the 
possibility that in some instances the end-user might be deemed the “performer.” 
The Court has not directly ruled on the following issues: 
Whether remote storage services are publicly performing content stored at the 
direction of their customers (but the opinion strongly suggests those services are 
not publicly performing); 
Whether “volition” is a predicate to determine whether a remote storage service 
“makes” the consumer-requested copies created and retained on its servers; 
Perhaps most importantly, because Aereo concerned only the public performance right, 
the Court did not have occasion to address whether the distribution right encompasses 
offers to distribute digital copies, or is limited to actual distributions of digital copies.  As 
a result, the greatest inconsistency between U.S. compliance and its international 
obligation to implement the “making available” right remains unremediated. 
 
 In the interval following the prior Letter from the U.S., published in the July and October 
2008 issues of the RIDA,1 calls for major reform of the 1976 Copyright Act have grown louder 
and more detailed,2 but so far no significant copyright legislation has emerged.  This Letter from 
the U.S. therefore will address only caselaw developments since late 2008.  Moreover, I will 
                                                            
1 Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part I, Legislative Developments: Orphan Works, 217 Revue 
Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 99 (July 2008); Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part II, Caselaw: 
Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?, 218 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 167 (October 2008). 
2 See, e.g., Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 Colum. J. Law & Arts 3 (2013); Pamela Samuelson, 
The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1175 (2010). 
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confine the discussion to the theme of U.S. compliance with its international obligations under 
the Berne Convention, the WIPO Internet Treaties (WCT, WPPT) and the TRIPs Accord.  Two 
issues dominate that inquiry: first, whether the U.S.’ interpretation of the statutory scope of the 
distribution and public performance rights properly implements the WCT making available right, 
and second, whether the substantial expansion of the fair use exception exceeds the leeway that 
the Berne Convention, art. 9(2), WCT art. 10, and TRIPs art. 13 grant to member states to 
provide for exceptions and limitations to copyright.  The current installment of this Letter from 
the U.S. will cover the first issue; the next installment, in a future number of the RIDA, will 
address the second. 
I. U.S. implementation of the “making available” right 
The “making available” right, as articulated in the WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8 (and the 
WPPT arts. 10 and 14), applies to the offering to the public of on-demand access to a work in the 
form of a stream or of a download.  The WCT text is clear that the right covers the offer of 
individualized access to works, not merely their actual communication, because the text specifies 
the “making available to the public of [authors’] works in such a way that members of the public 
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them” (emphasis 
supplied).3  Because the text does not distinguish between access to digital copies and access to 
performances, compliance with the WCT requires a member state to cover both kinds of access 
(streaming and downloading), and to cover not only actual transmissions of streams and 
downloads, but also the offering to communicate the work as a stream or a download, to 
members of the public separated both in space and in time.  
                                                            
3 See, e.g., Sam Ricketson & Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights: The Berne 
Convention and Beyond, supra, para. 12.58: “simply offering the work on an undiscriminating basis, so that any 
member of the general public may access the work, should come within the scope of the right.  . . . It is not 
necessary that the offer be accepted: ‘making available’ embraces incipient as well as effected communications.”;  
WIPO Guide to the Copyright and Related Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO (2003) at CT-86 (“It had to be 
accepted and clarified that this concept [making available] extends not only to the acts that are carried out by the 
‘communications’ themselves (that is, to the acts as a result of which a work or object of related rights is, in fact, 
made available to the public and the members of the public do not have to do more than, for example, switch on 
equipment necessary for its reception), but also to the acts which only consist of making the work accessible to the 
public, and in the case of which the members of the public still have to cause the system to make it actually available 
to them.”) 
The European Union has adopted the WCT art. 8 making available right verbatim, in the 2001 Information Society 
Directive, art. 3(1).  The Court of Justice of the European Union, in Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine 
Sahlman, Pia Gadd v Retreiver Sverige AB (Case C-466/12) (Feb. 13, 2014), recently confirmed that the “making 
available” right covers  potential as well as completed access to works of authorship.  See para. 19: "a work is made 
available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective of whether they 
avail themselves of that opportunity" and para. 20: "It follows that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the 
main proceedings, the provision of clickable links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ 
and, therefore, an ‘act of communication’,"  Accord, S. Von Lewinski & M. M. Walter, “Information Society 




The “umbrella solution” adopted at the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that yielded the 
WCT and WPPT allows member states to implement the making available right through a 
variety of means, including, for example, an all-embracing “making available” right, or a 
combination of a public performance right covering streams and a digital distribution right 
covering downloads.4  Whatever the means chosen, however, the member state must ensure that 
its law covers the offering to the public of on-demand access to a work both as a stream and as a 
download. 
The U.S. implementation of the making available right reveals the potential shortcomings 
of relying on multiple exclusive rights collectively to cover the full range of acts comprised 
within the making available right: some features of the right may end up left out.  The U.S. has 
assigned the offering and communication of digital streams to the public performance right, and 
downloads to the reproduction and distribution rights.  Implementation of the making available 
right through these pre-existing exclusive rights required no amendments to the Copyright Act, 
U.S. authorities assured, because the combination of rights sufficed.5  Full coverage of the 
making available right through a combination of rights has nonetheless proved elusive in the 
U.S.     
At the time of ratification, however, U.S. authorities did not anticipate the difficulties that 
have subsequently ensued.  As a study published in 2013 by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(“Green Paper”) explains, 
When the United States implemented the WIPO Internet Treaties in the DMCA, it did not 
include an explicit “making available” right, as both Congress and the Administration 
concluded that the relevant acts were encompassed within the existing scope of exclusive 
rights. In addition to the existing reproduction and public performance rights, the 
distribution right, adopted in the 1976 Copyright Act, applied to digital transmissions as 
well as the distribution of physical copies. And the legislative history indicates that this 
right was intended to incorporate the prior law’s “publication” right, which included the 
mere offering of copies to the public. 
Since that time, a number of U.S. courts have addressed the “making available” right, 
primarily in the context of individuals uploading a work to a shared folder on a computer 
connected to a peer-to-peer network. A number of courts have concluded that the 
distribution right incorporates the concept of “making available” reflected in the WIPO 
Treaties. Some others have disagreed. All of these cases, however, have focused solely 
                                                            
4 The Records of the 1996 diplomatic conference indicate that member States may comply with the making available 
right either through local communication rights, or through a combination of rights, including the right to distribute 
copies, as the United States urged during the drafting period. (1996 Records at 675, para 301.)  For extensive 
discussion of the “umbrella solution,” by the coiner of the term, see; Mihaly Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the 
Internet (Oxford 2002) at 204-09, 496-509. 
5 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998) (“The treaties do not require any change in the substance of copyright 
rights or exceptions in U.S. law.”) 
5 
 
on the scope of the distribution right and predate the recent academic scholarship . . . 
reviewing previously unanalyzed legislative history.6 
A. “Making available” and the distribution right 
The Green Paper’s hopeful coda (“All of these cases, however, have focused solely on 
the scope of the distribution right and predate the recent academic scholarship described above, 
reviewing previously unanalyzed legislative history”) signals the problem: U.S. courts have 
inconsistently interpreted the scope of the distribution right.  The Green Paper’s hint to courts to 
heed academic commentators’ exploration of legislative history reveals the U.S. 
Administration’s fear that its uncertain caselaw may be putting the U.S. out of step with 
international norms. 
The U.S. encounters the danger of insufficient international compliance even though it 
has long been recognized in the U.S., as a matter of statute and caselaw, that the exclusive right 
to distribute the work in copies or phonorecords (17 U.S.C. sec. 106(3)) applies to digital files as 
well as to material copies.7  But, as the “Green Paper” acknowledges, and as discussed in the 
October 2008 Letter from the U.S.,8 the authorities are inconsistent as to whether the distribution 
right extends both to offers as well as to actual deliveries of digital copies.  For the moment, only 
federal district courts have ruled on the question, but their rulings have ranged from simply 
asserting that the distribution right includes a making available right,9 to assimilating making 
available to “publication” (whose statutory definition encompasses offers to distribute),10 to 
requiring actual downloads.11  The last group of decisions thus leaves a gap in U.S. coverage of 
the full range of the making available right.   
B. “Making available” and the public performance right 
                                                            
6 U.S. Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the 
Digital Economy (July 2013) [“Green Paper”] pp. 14-16 (footnotes omitted).  The recent scholarship referred to 
includes, Peter Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 
59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 1 (2011). 
7 See, e.g., in addition to the sources cited in the “Green Paper,” 17 U.S.C. sec 115(a) (“digital phonorecord 
delivery”); 115(c)(3)(A) (“compulsory licensee to distribute or authorize the distribution of a phonorecord of a 
nondramatic musical work by means of a digital transmission which constitutes a digital phonorecord delivery” – 
emphasis supplied). 
8 Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent  Developments   in  US Copyright – Part  II, Caselaw: Exclusive  Rights  on  the Ebb?,  
218 Revue  Internationale du  Droit  d’Auteur 167 (October 2008). 
9See, e.g., A&M Records v Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster”); Universal City Studios 
Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (D. Me. 2006); Motown Records Co. v. DiPietro, No. 04-CV-
2246, 2007 WL 576284 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Alburger, Civil No. 07-3705, 2009 WL 
3152153, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009). 
10 Elektra  Entm’t Group, Inc. v.  Barker, 551 F.Supp. 2d 234 (2008).  
11 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1225 (D. Minn. 2008); London-Sire Records, Inc.  v. 
Doe 1,542 F.Supp.2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008) (but presuming that an actual download occurred); Atl. Recording 
Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981-84 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
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Further doubt regarding the U.S.’ compliance with its international obligations arose 
from some federal courts,’ particularly the Second Circuit’s, removal of certain on-demand 
transmissions from the scope of the public performance right.  The 1976 Act’s definition of “to 
perform publicly" in fact was drafted in anticipation of consumer-initiated transmissions of 
performances.  The text specifies that one performs “publicly”: 
by transmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . . . to 
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places 
and at the same time or at different times.12 
This provision, known as the ‘transmit clause’, generally applies to electronic transmissions. To 
“transmit” a performance or display of the work is defined as meaning “to communicate it by 
any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they 
are sent.” “Devices” and “processes” expressly include those that were developed after the law 
came into effect.13 
1.  The Second Circuit’s threat to U.S. compliance with the WIPO Treaties’ 
“making available” right 
In 2008, in Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings (“Cablevision”),14 discussed in the October 
2008 Letter from the US,15 the Second Circuit nonetheless ruled that a remote video recording 
service’s on-demand transmissions made from “personalized” copies initially delivered by the 
service to its customers’ individualized cloud storage boxes did not violate the public 
performance right on the ground that the subsequent one-to-one transmissions were not “to the 
public” because they derived from the customer’s own copy and only that customer was “capable 
of receiving” a transmission from that copy.  The court also held that the service’s storage of the 
personal source copies did not violate the reproduction right, on the ground that the customers, 
not the service, “made” the copies residing on the service’s computers, because, given the 
automated nature of the service, only the customers exercised specific “volition” as to what 
content to copy.  In the October 2008 Letter, I suggested that the Second Circuit’s interpretations 
of the reproduction and public performance rights were likely to spawn new copyright-avoiding 
                                                            
12 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
13 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, 94th Cong. 2d sess. at 64 (1976)): “The definition of ‘transmit’ . . . is broad 
enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless communications media, including 
but by no means limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them. Each and every method by which the 
images or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a ‘transmission,’ and if the 
transmission reaches the public in [any] form, the case comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106.”; 
H.R. Rep. No. 90-83, 90th Cong., 1st sess. at 29 (1967): the legislation anticipates “the case of sounds or images 
stored in an information system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of individual members 
of the public.”. 
14 Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 536 F. 3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
15 Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent  Developments   in  US Copyright – Part  II, Caselaw: Exclusive  Rights  on  the Ebb?,  
218 Revue  Internationale du  Droit  d’Auteur 167 (October 2008). 
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business models to exploit transmissions of copyrighted works.16  Were these new modes of 
offering transmissions of copyrighted works to the public to remain copyright-free, U.S. 
compliance with its obligation to implement the WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right would 
be endangered.  The subsequent Aereo controversy, ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in 
June 2014,17 proved the prediction true. 
In 2012, a New York City company called Aereo began a service that allowed 
subscribers, for a monthly fee, to access live (or recorded) broadcast television via a Web 
browser from the subscriber’s Internet-connected computer or mobile device or home video 
streaming device. The service worked by allowing a subscriber to connect to a very small 
antenna, located at Aereo’s data center, that received broadcast television signals.  According to 
Aereo’s website, “When you log in, you are assigned a miniaturized, private, remote antenna. 
Once you’ve connected to your antenna, you can use the Aereo platform to access all major 
broadcast networks live in HD.”18 Aereo also provided subscribers with a remote DVR service 
that allowed the subscriber to record selected programming: when a subscriber chose to record a 
show, his assigned antenna housed at the Aereo data center would be directed to tune to the 
channel broadcasting the program and route the digital broadcast stream to his remote DVR. The 
subscriber could then later choose to view the remotely recorded program on any Aereo-
supported device. 
Television broadcasters sued Aereo alleging copyright infringement. The District Court 
ruled that Cablevision controlled, and that Aereo had therefore not “publicly performed” the 
television programs.19 A divided Second Circuit affirmed. The majority reiterated its view that 
“the relevant inquiry under the Transmit Clause is the potential audience of a particular 
transmission, not the potential audience for the underlying work or the particular performance of 
that work being transmitted.”20 It also held that there were “two essential facts” which led to the 
holding that Cablevision’s transmissions were not public performances: that its RS-DVR allowed 
each subscriber to create unique copies of each program, and that the transmission of the 
recording to a subscriber was from that unique copy.21 These features meant that “the potential 
audience of every RS-DVR transmission was only a single Cablevision subscriber, namely the 
subscriber who created the copy,” and that limitation meant that the transmission was not “to the 
public”.22 Aereo’s system had those same two features.23 
 The dissenting judge charged that Aereo’s technical architecture was “a sham”: 
                                                            
16 Id. 
17 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
18 AEREO, https://aereo.com (last visited May 27, 2014) After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Aereo Website is 
no longer active. 
19 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
20 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 691 (2d Cir. 2013). 
21 Id. at 689. 
22 Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted). 
23 Id. at 690. 
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The system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no 
technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas rather than 
one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-
engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of 
a perceived loophole in the law. 24 
Rejecting the contention that, to hold that Aereo’s transmissions were not public 
performances would be to “exalt[] form over substance, because the Aereo system is functionally 
equivalent to a cable television provider,”25 the majority nonetheless rejoined, ‘”[T]hat Aereo 
was able to design a system based on Cablevision’s holding to provide its users with nearly live 
television over the internet is an argument that Cablevision was wrongly decided; it does not 
provide a basis for distinguishing Cablevision.”26 The majority noted that many other technology 
providers, particularly cloud computing services, had also designed their systems around 
Cablevision’s holdings. “Perhaps the application of the Transmit Clause should focus less on the 
technical details of a particular system and more on its functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . 
. held that technical architecture matters.”27 Acknowledging that it is more difficult to distinguish 
between public and private transmissions than when Congress enacted the transmit clause in 
1976, the majority ultimately concluded that the language of the Act, as previously interpreted in 
Cablevision, dictated the conclusion that Aereo’s transmissions were not public performances.28 
The Supreme Court reversed.29  A 6-3 majority (Breyer, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) held that Aereo was “performing” the broadcast programming 
when the service captured the programming through the users’ individually-assigned antennas, 
then digitized, momentarily stored in individualized copies and retransmitted the programming to 
its subscribers at their request.30  The majority also ruled that the performances were “to the 
public” notwithstanding each transmission’s origin in a separate subscriber-assigned copy.  The 
majority emphasized Aereo’s resemblance to cable retransmission operators, a service Congress 
in the 1976 Copyright Act unambiguously brought within the scope of the exclusive right of 
public performance.31  Although the majority distinguished less cable-like transmission services, 
notably “cloud storage” models such as Dropbox, and RS-DVR services, it declined to elaborate 
on the implications of its holdings for these other kinds of internet-based enterprises.32  Finally, 
the majority posited that in appropriate cases, even if the service is deemed to be “publicly 
performing” third party content, the fair use doctrine might excuse the transmission.33  The 
                                                            
24 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting).   
25 Id. 
26 Id. at  694. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 695. 
29 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
30 Id. at 2506. 
31 Id. at 2506, 2509. 




dissenters (Scalia, joined by Thomas and Alito) did not address the “public” character of the 
performance because they contended that Aereo lacked sufficient volition to be “performing” the 
programming.34  The dissenters distinguished video on-demand services, who exercise volition 
in the selection of content offered to consumers, from automated retransmission services, which 
simply relay an upstream transmission entity’s (in this case, the broadcasters’) selection of 
programming proposed to users.35 
2. Implications of the Supreme Court’s Aereo decision for U.S. compliance with the 
WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right 
 In assessing the impact of the Supreme Court’s Aereo opinion on the state of U.S. 
compliance with the WIPO Treaties’ “making available” right, I focus on four issues:  
a. coverage of a-synchronous transmissions (in accordance with the treaties’ specification that 
the right cover the possibility for members of the public to access works “from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them”); 
b. identification of “the public” and “members of the public” consistently with their meaning in 
the WIPO Treaties;  
c. interpretation of the public performance right in a way that does not limit the right to actual 
transmissions, but instead encompasses offers to transmit performances of works; 
d. the relevance of a “volition” prerequisite to application of the public performance and 
reproduction rights, and the consistency of any such prerequisite with international norms. 
 
a.  A-synchronicity 
 The Aereo decision clearly establishes that communications to the public comprehended 
within the 1976 Copyright Act’s public performance rights36 may be a-synchronous.  The 
“transmit clause” of the U.S. Copyright Act defines “[t]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’” 
in relevant part as:  
by transmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . . . to 
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places 
and at the same time or at different times.37 
                                                            
34 Id. at 2514. 
35 Id. at 2513. 
36 17 U.S.C. sec. 106(4) and (6), (and, implicitly, the sec. 106(5) public display right). 
37 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, current through P.L. 113-66) (emphasis supplied). 
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The Second Circuit in Aereo had understood the “it” in the Transmit Clause to mean the 
particular transmission communicated to the recipient, and in the case of individualized 
transmissions, had held that because only one person was “capable of receiving” that 
transmission, the performance was not “public.”  Rejecting this reading, the Supreme Court 
clarified that the object of the right was the performance of the work, not a particular 
transmission of a performance, and ruled that 
[A]n entity may transmit a performance through one or several transmissions, where the 
performance is of the same work.  That is because one can "transmit" or "communicate" 
something through a set of actions. Thus one can transmit a message to one's friends, 
irrespective of whether one sends separate identical e-mails to each friend or a single e-
mail to all at once. So can an elected official communicate an idea, slogan, or speech to 
her constituents, regardless of whether she communicates that idea, slogan, or speech 
during individual phone calls to each constituent or in a public square. 
 The fact that a singular noun ("a performance") follows the words "to transmit" 
does not suggest the contrary. One can sing a song to his family, whether he sings the 
same song one-on-one or in front of all together. Similarly, one's colleagues may watch a 
performance of a particular play--say, this season's modern-dress version of "Measure for 
Measure"--whether they do so at separate or at the same showings. By the same principle, 
an entity may transmit a performance through one or several transmissions, where the 
performance is of the same work. 
 The Transmit Clause must permit this interpretation, for it provides that one may 
transmit a performance to the public “whether the members of the public capable of 
receiving the performance . . . receive it . . . at the same time or at different times.” §101. 
Were the words “to transmit . . . a performance” limited to a single act of communication, 
members of the public could not receive the performance communicated “at different 
times.”  Therefore, in light of the purpose and text of the Clause, we conclude that when 
an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to 
multiple people, it transmits a performance to them regardless of the number of discrete 
communications it makes.  . . .  So whether Aereo transmits from the same or separate 
copies, it performs the same work; it shows the same images and makes audible the same 
sounds. Therefore, when Aereo streams the same television program to multiple 
subscribers, it “transmit[s] . . . a performance” to all of them.38  
To stick with Shakespeare (albeit in paraphrase), the “work’s the thing”: not the temporal 
coincidence of its performances.  The Supreme Court therefore has corrected a significant error 
in the Second Circuit’s construction of the “transmit clause,” an error which, had it persisted, 
                                                            




would have placed the U.S. out of compliance with respect to on-demand communications, 
where transmissions would inevitably occur at different times.    
b. “The public” 
i. Meaning of “the public” in the Berne Convention and the WCT 
The Berne Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaty mandate protection for two kinds of 
public communications of works: performances in public, and “communication” of the work to 
the public by transmission.  The first kind, covered in Berne Convention articles 11, 11ter, 14 
and 14bis, concerns performances in places open to the public; the public is present at these 
performances and therefore apprehends them directly.  The second kind, “communication to the 
public,” provided-for in the cited Berne Convention articles as well as in Berne Convention art. 
11bis and WCT art 8 and WPPT arts. 10 and 14, reaches members of the public through the 
intermediary of any manner of wired or wireless transmission.  Neither Convention defines “the 
public.” But the concept implies its opposite: some performances or communications by 
transmission will be “private” in nature.  The “private” quality of the performance or 
communication may be ascertained by the size of the potential audience; if only an insubstantial 
number of persons have the opportunity to attend the performance in person (public 
performance) or to receive it via transmission (communication to the public), the Berne 
Convention and WCT rights are not engaged.   
 It is important to emphasize “potential” audience: a performance in a place open to the 
public is a public performance, even if an insubstantial number of people in fact attend.  
Similarly, a transmission offered to the public at large does not become “private” if only a few 
members of the public in fact receive (or watch or listen to) it.39  The WCT “gives greater 
indication than does the Berne Convention that the relevant ‘public’ is comprised of ‘members’, 
and, accordingly, need not be populous, although the greater the numbers to whom a work is 
made available, the more apparent the conclusion that the making available was to ‘the public’. 
But simply offering the work on an undiscriminating basis, so that a member of the public may 
access the work, should come within the scope of the right.  Even more restricted offers, such as 
to all university students, or to all aficionados of obscure Australian or Estonian poetry, appeal to 
an audience potentially too large for a ‘family circle’ or similar exclusion.”40  Put another way, 
different kinds of works may have different “publics;” the potential audience for a Hollywood 
action film may be far greater than the potential audience for a European “art” film (in which 
nothing happens), but both are directed toward persons whose only relationship to the copyright 
owner and to each other is their predilection for that type of work. 
                                                            
39 Accord, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (an infringer communicates a performance to the public, whether or 
not the “members of the public capable of receiving” it are “operating [their] receiving apparatus at the time of the 
transmission”). 
40 Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond, para. 12.58 (2006).     
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 The Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaties leave to member states the precise 
demarcation of the line between public and private communications. For example, member states 
may exclude from the scope of the right performances or communications to a “family circle,”41 
or enlarge the “private” zone to cover not only family but also its “social acquaintance,”42 or 
define “the public” to mean “an indeterminate number of potential recipients [which] implies, 
moreover, a fairly large number of persons.”43  But wherever a member state sets the dividing 
line, one may infer that the “public” character of a communication turns on the opportunity for a 
substantial number of unrelated persons to receive the work being communicated. 
 Commercial benefit furnishes another dividing line between public and private 
communications: if members of the public are invited to pay to receive the communication, it is 
unlikely to be private in nature.44  But one should beware the negative inference: it does not 
follow that a not-for-profit communication is therefore not “to the public;” many non 
commercial performances nonetheless are amply “public.”45  Rather, the commercial nature of 
the performance is a one-way street, furnishing an indicium of the “public” character of the 
communication, but not concomitantly permitting a characterization of a non commercial 
communication as not “to the public.” 
ii. The meaning of “the public” in Aereo 
The Supreme Court in Aereo elaborated on the meaning of a performance “to the public.”  
The Court emphasized that “an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit to a 
substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle.”46  The Court 
distinguished Aereo, which it viewed as akin to a traditional cable television retransmission 
service, from “an entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their capacities as owners 
or possessors”; such a service “does not perform to ‘the public,’ whereas an entity like Aereo 
                                                            
41 See, e.g., France Code de la propriété intellectuelle, art. L 122-5(1) («Les représentations privées et gratuites 
effectuées exclusivement dans un cercle de famille ») (« private and free performances effectuated exclusively in a 
family circle ») 
42 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. sec. 101. 
43 ECJ, ITV Broadcasting  Ltd. and Others v. TVCatchup Ltd., C-607/11 [2013], para. 32 (elaborating on the 
meaning of “public” in InfoSoc Directive art. 3(1)). 
44 See Ricketson & Ginsburg, para 12.02, suggesting that the “public” character of the performance or 
communication should be assessed in light of its economic impact: “The dividing line between ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
is not always easy to draw, and the Convention contains no specific guidance in this regard.  However, the following 
general principle can be derived from a study of the structure of the Convention. Articles 11, 11bis, 11ter, 14, and 
14bis deal with certain of the author’s pecuniary rights, that is, some of the ways in which she can exploit her work. 
Accordingly, the rights of public performance and of communication to the public must refer to the author’s 
capacity to authorize performances of the work before or communications of the work to a substantial number of 
unrelated persons. The larger and more disparate the audience, the greater the impact on the author’s ability to 
exploit the work in relation to her ‘public’, that is, those who are willing to pay for the benefit of hearing or seeing 
the work performed.” 
45 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. sec. 110 (covering a variety of non commercial public performances, and providing 
exemptions from liability; the exemptions do not put in question the “public” character of the performances, rather 
they absolve the performing entity from obtaining permission or paying to engage in the public performance). 
46 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at  2511.. 
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that transmits to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the 
works does so perform.”47   
 The Court’s reference to “owners or possessors” is, at best, very imprecise; the service’s 
customer is unlikely to be an owner of “the work” because “the work” is the incorporeal object 
whose “owner” is the author or other copyright owner.  Presumably, based on the submissions by 
the amicus curiae briefs, including the United States’, the Court was positing the request by a 
customer of a remote storage service to play back a digital copy that she was entitled, by express 
or implied license, or under the fair use doctrine, to deposit in a digital storage locker.  In that 
event, even if multiple customers separately stored the same content with the service, the latter’s 
subsequent on-demand play back of performances of the same work to those customers would 
not be a transmission to “the public” by the service or the customer: “[T]he term ‘the public’ . . . 
does not extend to those who act as owners or possessors of the relevant product.”48  “Product” 
in this context apparently includes a license to access the stored content.  When a digital storage 
service plays content acquired and stored by customers back to those customers, then, there is no 
public performance.   
 However, in addition to the customer’s entitlement of access (which the Court treated as 
a possessory relationship) to the customer-stored content, the Court introduced a further 
consideration: “And we have not considered whether the public performance right is infringed 
when the user of a service pays primarily for something other than the transmission of 
copyrighted works, such as the remote storage of content.”49  The Court appears to be focusing 
on the nature of the commercial relationship between the customer and the service.  Remote 
storage services are transmitting content to members of the public (their subscribers) when they 
play back the files requested by the users.50  Unlike pay (or listen)-on-demand, however, the 
service for which the members of the public are paying is not the opportunity to receive 
transmissions of performances of particular works offered by the service, but rather to store 
whatever content the users post, whatever its source, and make it accessible remotely.  The 
customers pay the same subscription fees whatever the content they store and access.  Thus, 
while there is a public that pays in dollars or in subjection to advertising51 (or other costs of 
“free” commercial services), the public is not specifically paying for transmissions of 
performances of any given copyrighted works. 
                                                            
47 Id., at 2510. 
48 Id. 
49 Id., at 2511. 
50 Arguably, if the customer is requesting playback of content she selected and stored in “her” cloud locker, the 
service’s role in the communication might be too passive, limited to the technical relay of the content, to be deemed 
the party who “performs” the content.  See Aereo, 134 S.Ct. at 2507 (“In other cases involving different kinds of 
service or technology providers, a user's involvement in the operation of the provider's equipment and selection of 
the content transmitted may well bear on whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act.”).   
51 The analysis would be different, however, if the service targeted advertising to the played-back content.  At that 
point, the “commercial relationship” between the service and the consumer would focus on particular works; the 
service would have foregone the content-neutrality that justifies a conclusion that the service is not publicly 
performing the played-back works. 
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 Whether a service is performing “publicly,” then, appears to turn on the nature of the 
service for which customers are paying.  The service’s customers are certainly members of the 
public, but the same act by the service – transmitting a performance of a given work – may or 
may not be a public performance depending on the existence of some kind of possessory 
relationship between the individual members of the public and a copy of or a license to use the 
content, and depending on whether the service is primarily offering streaming access to specified 
copyrighted works. 
iii.  Consistency with international norms 
 A reformulation of the Court’s statement that “an entity does not transmit to the public if 
it does not transmit to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle,”52 
as an affirmative assertion – that an entity that transmits [a performance of a work] to a 
substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle is publicly performing the 
work – seems to conform to international norms.  But if the “public” character of a transmission 
of a performance also depends on the relationship of the customer of the transmission entity to 
the copyrighted work (owner of a copy; licensee of an access right), is this gloss also consistent 
with international norms?  As discussed above, the treaties permit certain inferences concerning 
the size and nature of a communication’s potential audience, but do not introduce distinctions 
based on any possessory relationship of the members of the public to the content of the work.  
That said, the inquiry into the nature of the service implied by the Court’s attention to the kind of 
service (storage v. transmission of particular works) for which the members of the public who 
constitute its customers are paying is not necessarily inconsistent with international norms.   
 To ask whether the service is offering to transmit performances of particular copyrighted 
works to members of the public, or whether these transmissions instead are ancillary to some 
other service (storage) that does not trigger the right of communication to the public (though it 
may implicate the right of reproduction), is to focus on the economic dimension of the 
communication.  The above-cited articles of the Berne Convention and the WCT all concern 
exploitations of the work; they confer on the author the exclusive rights to authorize various 
kinds of exploitations (or, in the case of art. 11bis(2), the right to be remunerated for certain 
retransmissions).  It may follow that “the public” should correspond to “the group which the 
copyright owner would otherwise contemplate as its public for the performance of its work.”53 
Arguably, the essence of a performance “to the public” is that it is occurring in circumstances 
where the owner is entitled to expect payment for the work’s authorized performance because the 
performing entity is exploiting the work.54  In Aereo, the Court’s emphasis on the resemblance 
between Aereo’s retransmission service and a traditional cable television retransmission service 
                                                            
52 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
53 Telstra Corp. v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1997) 191 CLR 140, 199.  See also Ricketson & Ginsburg, 
supra, para 12.02. 
54 See, e.g., Telstra Corp. v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1997) 191 CLR 140, 198-99.  This 
characterization, however, runs the risk of circularity.   
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reflects a determination that if the Copyright Act entitles broadcasters to payment for cable 
retransmission, then broadcasters are also entitled to payment for cable-like retransmissions.  By 
contrast, copyright owners are not entitled to expect payment when members of the public view 
legitimately-acquired copies of films at home; arguably it should make no difference whether the 
home-viewed copy is stored at home, or stored remotely. 
 Thus, the Court’s focus on a possessory relationship between the member of the public 
and the source copy for the transmission enjoys some support as a matter of construction of the 
right of communication to the public in the Berne Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaties.  
Nonetheless, the analysis is problematic because it appears to make the public character of a 
work turn on a prior analysis of infringement: if the author is entitled to control the exploitation, 
then a third party’s exploitation is “to the public,” but if the author is not entitled to expect 
payment, then the communication is not to the public.  As a result, the question of the prima 
facie application of exclusive rights may become improperly conflated with the question of 
copyright exceptions.  But as section 110 of the Copyright Act demonstrates, a communication, 
for example in the course of online education, may be a “public performance” yet be subject to a 
narrow exemption from liability.  For example, if the TEACH Act exceptions in section 110(2) 
apply, the copyright holder is not entitled to expect payment, but there is no question that the 
transmissions are to (a defined segment of) the public.  Aereo itself did not invite this confusion 
of the public character of a performance with liability for infringement, but if one is to 
understand the Court’s attention to the nature of the service as implying a distinction between 
uses that the copyright owner may control (because, for want of a better term, they “feel” like 
they belong in the public performance camp) and uses that the copyright owner may not (because 
they “feel” like acts transpiring in private), then it becomes important to bear in mind that a 
communication can be “to the public” even if, by virtue of an exception, it falls outside the 
copyright owner’s rights.  
c.  Actual transmissions or offers to transmit 
 The Aereo opinion construes the Transmit Clause component of the definition of “to 
perform publicly” in a way which often appears to assume that actual transmissions have 
occurred (as was the case with the Aereo service).  It does not, however, therefore follow that the 
Court has excluded offers to transmit from the scope of the statutory exclusive right.  First, while 
the Court emphasized that “an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit to a 
substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle,”55 it elsewhere equated 
Aereo’s offering of its service to an infringement of the public performance right.  Hence: “We 
must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right [of public 
performance] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to 
watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast 
                                                            
55 Aereo, 134 S.Ct. at 2511. 
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over the air. We conclude that it does.”56  What triggers the infringement is the “selling” of a 
service that “allows” subscribers to view the programs; the court does not require that a 
subscriber consummate the infringement by viewing an actual transmission. 
 Second, as the following analysis shows, the Court’s statements make sense only if the 
scope of the right includes offers to transmit performances of works.  If one disregards the 
Court’s characterization of the infringement as occurring “by selling” a service that “allows” its 
subscribers to view live television, and instead takes literally the Court’s statement that “an 
entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit . . .”, it would follow there is no 
transmission to “the public” if the service does not in fact communicate the performance of the 
work to a substantial number of people.  But therefore to characterize the communication as 
“private” is questionable: if performances of a work are offered to the public, for example, on a 
pay-per-view basis, the characterization of the performances as “to the public” should not turn on 
how many members of the public accept the offer and in fact request a transmission of the 
performance.  If one were to understand the Court’s statement as meaning actual, rather than 
offered, transmissions, then the "public" nature of a performance could not be ascertained 
without post-hoc head-counting.  Not only does such an interpretation introduce uncertainty for 
copyright owners and exploiters alike, but it promotes the kinds of baroque copyright-avoiding 
business models the Court discredited.  Given the Copyright Act’s inclusion in the public 
performance right of discrete transmissions to the public that are separated in time, were only 
actual transmissions to trigger the public performance right, then the service might be permitted 
to make an "insubstantial" number of transmissions to paying subscribers before the number of 
transmissions tipped over into communicating the performance of the work to a "substantial" 
number of unrelated persons.  If the service is in effect allowed up to, say, fifty “free” 
transmissions, then one might imagine the creation of a plethora of separately constituted 
subsidiary services each catering to no more than fifty members of the public.  But if such a 
scenario seems unlikely to “fool” any trial judge as to the nature of the service, that is because 
we sense that a judge, aware of the Supreme Court’s rejection of Aereo’s attempt to render 
“private” the communications Aereo offered to the public at large, would focus on the offer to 
transmit, rather than on the actual communication of a transmission.   
 Moreover, although the Supreme Court conflated the two kinds of “public” in the 
statutory definition of “to perform publicly” – performance in public (where a substantial 
number of persons other than a circle of family and its social acquaintance is gathered); 
performance by transmission to the public – the Transmit Clause does not in fact require that the 
“members of the public” capable of receiving the transmission of the performance be numerous.  
Indeed, what matters, in determining whether the audience for a transmission is “the public,” is 
                                                            
56 Id. at 2503.  Similarly, id. at 2504: “Considered alone, the language of the Act does not clearly indicate when an 
entity "perform[s]" (or "transmit[s]") and when it merely supplies equipment that allows others to do so. But when 
read in light of its purpose, the Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like Aereo's performs.”  
Those activities include not only transmitting the content, but offering the service to subscribers. 
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capacity by “members of the public” to receive the transmission, not actual receipt.57    Those 
who are “capable of receiving” the performance by transmission are those to whom the 
transmission is offered.  Under this reading, the offer of streaming access triggers the public 
performance right; it is not necessary to await actual transmission, even to one member of the 
public, to ascertain if the right has been engaged.     
d. the relevance of a “volition” prerequisite to application of the public performance and 
reproduction rights, and the consistency of any such prerequisite with international norms. 
 The Second Circuit’s introduction in Cablevision of a “volition” prerequisite to the act of 
reproduction, and its extension to the act of public performance advocated by Aereo, Inc. and the 
Supreme Court dissenters, could prove a significant impediment to U.S. implementation of the 
making available right.  The right is in many respects user-focused because it targets on-demand 
communications.  Unlike traditional “push” technologies, in which the copyright owner or 
licensee determines when to disseminate the content, the “pull” technologies that exploit the 
making available right enable the consumer to select what content she wishes, and where and 
when to receive it.  If a “volition” predicate were to mean that the exploiter is not making a work 
available because the exploiter merely responds automatically to the end-user’s choice of what, 
when and where to receive the communication of a copyrighted work, then the “making 
available” right would collapse.  By the same token, a determination that an online service does 
not “make” the copy that it offers to deliver to or store for the consumer on her request, or that it 
does not “perform” the offered work because the consumer decided which of the offered works 
she wanted transmitted to her at a place (or device) and time selected by her, eviscerates the 
utility of the reproduction and public performance rights to effecutate the making available right.  
To assess the U.S. post-Aereo compliance with international norms, it therefore is necessary to 
inquire into the current status of any “volition” predicate to the determination whether the 
defendant has engaged in a copyright-triggering act.  
i. Aereo’s treatment of volition as a predicate to application of the public 
performance right  
The Aereo majority’s silence on the matter of “volition” in the face of the dissenters’ 
emphatic interpolation of a “volition” predicate might suggest that the majority considers 
“volition” irrelevant to the assessment of whether the defendant has publicly performed a work.  
The majority’s analysis of whether Aereo “perform[s] at all” 58 distinguishes between the mere 
provision of equipment and “engag[ing] in activities like Aereo’s.”59  The majority underscored 
Congress’ rejection in the 1976 Act of the Court’s Fortnightly60 and Teleprompter61 precedents, 
                                                            
57 As discussed above, “the public” could be the public at large, or smaller subsets, such as the fans of a particular 
performer, or devotees of cooking shows; what matters is that the potential audience be otherwise unrelated to the 
copyright owner or to each other.  
58 Aereo, 134 S.Ct. at 2504 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 Id. 
60 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
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in which the Court had held that traditional cable television retransmission services were merely 
providing equipment that the customers might themselves have installed (given the Court’s 
rather fanciful evocation of the customers’ acts, such as placing an aerial on a mountaintop and 
stringing a wire from the mountaintop to the customer’s home), and not “performing” the works 
that the services retransmitted to their customers.  According to Aereo, a service “performs” 
copyrighted works, rather than simply supplying equipment, when it “uses its own equipment, 
housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes,” to transmit performances of 
works to viewers, even when that equipment “may . . . emulate equipment a viewer could use at 
home.”  62  The majority therefore appears to stress the service’s active engagement in the 
transmission, rather than any specific “volition” with respect to the particular content 
transmitted. 
Indeed, the majority’s rejection of the dissent’s characterization of Aereo’s service as “a 
copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card,”63 underscores the irrelevance of the 
customer’s selection of which programming to watch to the determination of whether the service 
has “performed” the works it transmits.  The court also declined to attribute any significance to 
the additional layer of consumer intervention involved in Aereo’s system relative to cable 
systems: while cable systems retransmit sua sponte, Aereo does not activate the subscriber’s 
antenna without the subscriber’s request.  Adopting a pragmatic perspective, the Court 
announced that “this difference means nothing to the subscriber.  It means nothing to the 
broadcaster.” 64 
Nonetheless, the Court did not completely discount the role of the user in the 
determination of “who performs” a work: “a user’s involvement in the operation of the 
provider’s equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on whether the 
provider performs within the meaning of the Act.”65  This statement is a far cry from adopting 
the kind of “volition” predicate urged by the dissent (or, for that matter, by the Second Circuit in 
Cablevision), but it nonetheless suggests that when the service is less “cable-like” than Aereo, 
the majority’s distinction between providing the equipment that enables a performance, and 
actually “performing” remains uncertain. 
In any event, it should be clear, even under the dissent’s characterization, that specific 
“volition” as to the transmission of particular content is not required for the communication to be 
considered a “public performance.” All Justices agree that video on demand services are 
“performing,” and it should not matter how automated the process: once the service assembles 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
61 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
62 Aereo, 134 S.Ct. at 2507. 
63 Id., citing dissenting op. 134 S. Ct. at 2514.  The dissent’s analogy, and its purported distinction from pay-per-
view services (which the dissent acknowledges do “perform” the user-selected works, dissent at 2513-14) is in any 
event highly problematic.  The key distinction, for the dissent, is that video on demand services “choose the 
content” (id. at 2513, emphasis in original).  But libraries choose the books that comprise their collections. 




the selection of the programs from which the consumer may choose and then offers them 
commercially to the public, the service has gone beyond merely providing transmission facilities.  
For the majority, cable and cable-like services still “perform” even though they did not originate 
the selection of programming offered to the users (the broadcasters did, though the cable 
operators select the source broadcast stations whose content they retransmit), and even though 
the users ultimately choose which programs to watch, by turning a knob on the television, or 
clicking on a website.  (Of course, the last feature of user involvement is common to on-demand 
transmissions, too.)  If on-demand services occupy one end of the “who performs” continuum, 
and cable-like services stand at an intermediate – but still “performing” – point, some services 
that offer remote storage (but are entirely agnostic as to the content users store) might be located 
at the other end. 
ii. “Volition” and the reproduction right 
There is another reason to interpret Aereo as blunting the pertinence of a “volition” 
prerequisite to copyright-triggering acts.  While Aereo addressed only the public performance 
right, the “volition” analysis, as derived from the Second Circuit’s Cablevision decision, 
threatens significantly to curtail the effectiveness of the reproduction right as well.  Indeed, if 
one reads Aereo to have no purchase on the reproduction right, the opportunities for eluding the 
import of the Supreme Court’s decision are readily apparent.  Suppose that instead of 
retransmitting programming in approximately real time, an Aereo-like service, responding 
automatically to user demand, recorded the entirety of a broadcast program and then transmitted 
the file to the user to be viewed or heard only following (and not simultaneously with) the 
download of the file.  Aereo specified that “to transmit a performance of (at least) an audiovisual 
work means to communicate contemporaneously visible images and contemporaneously audible 
sounds of the work.”66  And the Court cited with approval the Second Circuit decision that 
declined to characterize a transmission in the nature of a download as a “performance.”67 
In this scenario, there is no public performance, because the service is not transmitting a 
performance, it is distributing a copy.  (In a more elaborate version of the scenario, the service 
would record and transmit the programming in 10-minute increments, so that the user can watch 
the program only 10 minutes after “real time.”)  Except that, if the Cablevision “volition” 
predicate pertains, the copyright-implicating actor would not be the service, it would be the user.  
(On-demand services that deliver non contemporaneously perceptible files which the users 
choose from among a collection of works assembled by the service presumably should satisfy 
any “volition” requirement on the part of the service.)  The Aereo Court declined to project the 
effect of its decision on remote time-shifting services, but one may query whether the posited 
                                                            
66 Id. at 2508. 
67 US v ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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service is offering “time-shifting” (which may or may not be a public performance) or another 
Rube Goldberg-like work-around the public performance right.68 
iii. Volition and other iterations of the reproduction and public 
performance rights: Does an RS-DVR service make works available 
within the meaning of the WIPO Copyright Treaties? 
Aereo avoided ruling on whether RS-DVR services were “publicly performing” the 
works they retransmitted, but the question remains whether the Cablevision precedent, if its 
volition analysis is in any respect still good law, places the U.S. in tension with its obligation to 
implement the making available right.  If the activities of services like Cablevision and Aereo (in 
its time-shifting incarnation) are considered to make available the content of the copied and 
retransmitted works within the meaning of the WIPO Treaties, then the U.S. should not (for non-
US works) be free to exclude those services from the reach of the public performance and 
reproduction rights.  RS-DVR services, through a two-step process of transmission on demand, 
arguably engage in two series of acts covered by the making available right, first by 
communicating a copy of the work to the user’s storage device, and subsequently by transmitting 
it to the user for contemporaneous viewing. 
Several foreign authorities interpreting national or EU norms, have ruled that the services 
“make” the copies (thus violating the reproduction right)69 and/or make the works available to 
their subscribers.70  The EU Information Society Directive has implemented the WIPO Treaties’ 
making available right verbatim, see art. 3; EU judicial and administrative interpretations and the 
interpretations of member state courts therefore are probative of the application of the making 
available right to RS-DVR services, but cannot yet be said to constitute controlling “state 
practice” within the meaning of art. 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
                                                            
68  In fact, in the hearing on remand for a preliminary injunction, Aereo contended that a delay of somewhere 
between ten and thirty minutes would be sufficient to fall outside the Supreme Court’s characterization of a public 
performance. See American Broadcasting Companies v Aereo, Inc. 12 Civ. 01540 (AJN), WNET v Aereo, Inc., 12 
Civ. 10543 (AJN) Transcript of hearing on preliminary injunction, (SDNY October 15, 2014) at 28-29. The district 
court rejected that argument, granting a preliminary injunction which covered all transmissions made before the 
original broadcast was fully aired. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., opinion and order dated Oct. 23, 2014. 
69 See, e.g., Singtel Optus v National Rugby League Investments (No 2) [2012] FCA 34 (Aus.); Wizzgo v. 
Metropole Television et autres, Paris Court of Appeals, decision of 14 December 2011, 
http://www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=3297 (France) (automated “remote video 
recorder” service qualifies neither for transient copying nor for private copying exceptions because service, not the 
end-user, is the maker of the user’s individual copy); Rokuraku II (Supreme Court 2011) (Japan) (copies for 
individualized storage at subscriber request held to be “made” by the service), the decision is discussed in Takashi 
B. Yamamoto, ‘Legal Liability for Indirect Infringement of Copyright in Japan’ 
http://www.itlaw.jp/yearbook35.pdf.  Contra, Record TV Pte Ltd v MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 
830 (Singapore) (following Cablevision). 
70 Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale, Lazio Roma, sez. II, 02.3.2012, n. 2157, pp. 41-44 (Italy) (remote DVR 
makes works available under the meaning of the 2001 EU Information Society Directive).  See also Shift.tv, BGH 
(German Supreme Court), I ZT 152/11, 11 April 2013 (remote DVR service’s transmission of original signal to 
subscribers’ individual storage boxes violates broadcasters’ retransmission right); ManekiTV (Supreme Court 2011) 
(Japan), in Yamamoto, supra (personalized transmissions by service held public transmissions). 
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The WIPO Treaties may therefore allow member states some leeway in determining who 
is the “maker” of a copy, or the “performer” of a work; a “volition” predicate may not always be 
inconsistent with the U.S.’ international obligations.  Conformity with international norms may 
depend on the degree of specificity of any “volition” requirement.  For example, while a 
Cablevision-style volition predicate that requires specific agency as to each work transmitted 
may effectively eviscerate the making available right, a volition predicate that looked to the 
operation and economic impact of the service as a whole might not violate the U.S.’ obligations.   
The Aereo decision’s reference to a possessory relationship between the user and a copy 
of the work as a basis for distinguishing remote storage (and perhaps RS-DVR) services offers 
another means to reconcile an absence of copyright liability with international norms.  If the user 
was lawfully entitled to store a copy on the service’s facilities (and the service did not initially 
offer the content to the user), then the service’s mere retransmission of a performance of the 
work from that copy might be deemed to come within the Agreed Statement to WCT art. 8’s 
exclusion on the ground that “the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a 
communication does not in itself amount to communication.”   
In summary, the Supreme Court’s Aereo decision alleviates some concerns about the 
conformity of U.S. copyright law with international norms, but the limited scope of the decision 
allows other shortcomings to persist.  Thus, the court has reaffirmed the reach of the public 
performance right with respect to: 
near-real time individualized digital retransmissions to members of the public of 
broadcast content (akin to cable retransmissions); 
a-synchronous transmissions to members of the public when the primary value of the 
service to its customers is to transmit performances of content the customers did not 
themselves store with the service, or regarding which the customers did not enjoy some 
possessory relationship to a copy or right to access  
Although the Court did not expressly state that the public performance right encompassed offers 
to transmit performances as well as actual performances, the logic of the decision points toward 
the broader (and internationally harmonious) interpretation. 
The majority did not apply a specific “volition” predicate to determine whether a retransmission 
service “performs” the content it communicates, but it acknowledged the possibility that in some 
instances the end-user might be deemed the “performer.” 
The Court has not directly spoken to the following issues: 
Whether remote storage services are publicly performing content stored at the direction 




Whether “volition” is a predicate to determine whether a remote storage service “makes” 
the consumer-requested copies created and retained on its servers; 
Perhaps most importantly, because Aereo concerned only the public performance right, the Court 
did not have occasion to address whether the distribution right encompasses offers to distribute 
digital copies, or is limited to actual distributions of digital copies.  As a result, the greatest gap 
in U.S. compliance with its international obligation to implement the “making available” right 
remains unremediated. 
 
